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Abstract
We analyse the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice
obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret
but voting profiles are ‘leaked’ with an exogenously given probabil-
ity. We show that fully informative voting is generically possible only
when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the
unanimity rule and faces the possibility of leakage. It is then shown
that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties
of expert committees.
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1 Introduction
The relative quality of expert advice across fully transparent and fully secre-
tive committees has been the subject of a number of papers.1 Our objective
is to look into the performance of secretive committees that face an exoge-
nously given probability with which the recommendations of its members
are collectively ‘leaked’ to an evaluator (EV) of expertise. Such committees
will be called committees under leakage threats.2 When experts care only
∗Shiv Nadar University, India; Email: saptarshipg@gmail.com
†School of Management and Governance, Murdoch University, J.Roy@murdoch.edu.au
1See for example Gersbach and Hahn (2001) and (2011), Sibert (2003), Fingleton and
Raith (2005), Levy (2007a), Meade and Stasavage (2008), Swank and Visser (2010) and
Seidmann (2010).
2An example of the scenario we motivate could be the recent case involving the Federal
Open Market committee (FOMC) transcripts that were initially considered to be confi-
dential but ended up being public. The FOMC meetings were secretly videotaped up to a
point in time, and transcripts based on these recordings were released later on April 9th
and 10th, 2013. Other examples include the various instances of leakage conducted by
organisations such as Wikileaks, that have caused a lot of controversy in recent times.
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for the EV’s beliefs regarding their individual expertise (i.e., they are pure
careerists) we show (see Theorem 1) that to obtain informative voting (i.e.
voting in accordance to one’s updated beliefs) as an equilibrium outcome it
is necessary and sufficient to have a committee that (a) uses the unanimity
voting rule and faces a leakage threat and (b) the common prior is not too
informative. We then show (see Theorem 2) that informative voting hurts
social welfare.
Gersbach and Hahn (2001) were the first to explore the dichotomy be-
tween information acquisition and optimality in expert committees. They
compared a fully transparent and a fully secretive committee in a dynamic
model and found that a secretive process allows for better decisions while a
transparent process leads to better identification of the talents of the experts.
Sibert (2003) similarly argues that secretive processes yield better decisions
by reducing the incentive of agents to distort their actions to signal their
types. In our framework, the tendency to distort actions is present both in a
fully secretive as well as a fully transparent committee. Our model is closely
related to the work by Levy (2007a). She compares a fully transparent with
a fully secretive committee to show that careerist experts exhibit conformist
(herding) or non-conformist (anti-herding) tendencies so that their votes may
not be informative or efficient in either environment.3 Given this, our result
that leakage threats yield non-distorted advice is new. Levy (2007a) also
finds that if the common prior is sufficiently informative and biased towards
the status quo alternative, a secretive committee with the unanimity rule
induces the highest level of welfare. We show that this is not a local result as
it is robust to the possibility that transparency can be random (and of any
degree). Moreover, Levy (2007a) does not report welfare results when the
prior is not too biased (that is largely uninformative). We show that for such
cases, the opposite result holds where secrecy hurts welfare and it is optimal
to have perfectly transparent committees if one is confined to the unanimity
rule. Interestingly, we also find that in every such situation of low prior, the
simple majority rule yields the maximum welfare.4
3The possibilities of herding and anti-herding have been explored in earlier works
by Holmstrom (1999), Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Zwiebel (1995) and Ottaviani and
Sorensen (2006a and 2006b), although these works do not address voting in committees.
4In Levy (2007b), the analysis was confined to two member committees, and therefore
the welfare implications of the simple majority rule could not be addressed.
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2 The Model
There are two possible actions A and B. Information about which should be
the ‘correct choice’ is available from three equally salient and independent
sources (or dimensions), called 1, 2 and 3. The true state in dimension i
is wi ∈ W = {a, b}, i = 1, 2, 3, with the following interpretation: B is the
correct action according to dimension i if and only if wi = b. LetW = {a, b}3
with w = (w1, w2, w3) ∈ W being a state vector. Let π = Pr[wi = b] > 1/2 be
the common prior for each dimension i.5 The choice of an action is swayed
by the decision of a committee composed of three experts called i = 1, 2, 3.
Expert i is proficient exclusively in dimension i and receives a private signal
si ∈ S = {a, b} about the true state wi in his dimension of expertise. The
informative precision, denoted by ti, of the signal si is called expert i’s talent,
with ti ∈ T = [1/2, 1] so that Pr[si = a|wi = a] = Pr[si = b|wi = b] = ti.
Expert i’s talent is his private information and it is common knowledge that
ti is uniformly and independently distributed over the support T .
Expert i provides an advice mi ∈ M = {a, b} simultaneously and inde-
pendently along with the other experts and the advice (or simply vote) a
(likewise b) is construed as the pronouncement that “a (likewise b) is the
true state according to dimension i”. Denote by M = {a, b}3 the set of
vote profiles with m = (m1,m2,m3) ∈M. The decision of the committee is
denoted by dx and is defined by the voting rule x ∈ X = {2, 3} as follows:
dx :M→ {A,B} such that dx = A if and only if |{i : mi = a}| ≥ x. If x = 2
we call this majority while if x = 3 we call this A-unanimity (or, unanimity
in short). The voting rule x is common knowledge.
There is an evaluator (EV) whose goal is to estimate the individual talents
of the three experts. The true states wi, i = 1, 2, 3, are revealed to the EV
after all votes are cast and the committee decision dx (that is always observed
by the EV) is reached. A committee under the prospect of a possible leakage,
denoted by the pair C = (x, p), consists of a secret committee with voting
rule x and an exogenous probability p ∈ P = [0, 1] with which the vote profile
m = (m1,m2,m3) ∈M is revealed to the EV. Expert i’s (voting) strategy is a
function σi : T×S×P×X →M and let σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) be a strategy profile.
Let ζi : T ×S×P ×X →M be the conjecture held by the EV about expert
i’s voting strategy with ζ = (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3). Let τ(mi, wi, ζ) = E(ti|(mi, wi), ζ)
be the talent evaluation function which is simply the expectation held by
the EV about the true value of expert i’s talent, given his advice mi, the
observed state wi and the conjecture ζ. The pay-off function of expert i is
simply τ . We assume that each expert is an expected utility maximiser and
5Since π > 1/2, one may think of B as the “conventional” choice.
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votes in order to maximise the expected evaluation of his talent τ held by the
EV, where the expert’s expectations are based solely upon his own signal,
his talent and the common prior π.
The above environment leads to a Bayesian game of reputational cheap
talk and as in Levy (2007a) we consider symmetric equilibria in pure strate-
gies where the following hold: (i) each expert votes as if they are pivotal at
each event where their individual votes are not revealed to the EV,6 (ii) the
EV’s conjecture coincides with the voting strategies followed by the experts
and (iii) updating of beliefs follows the Bayes’ rule wherever possible. Let
v(π, ti|si) be the posterior probability-belief held by an expert with talent ti
who receives a private signal si that wi = a. We say that expert i’s strategy σi
is informative if σi implies the following: mi = b if and only if v(π, ti|si) ≤ 12
(and mi = a otherwise). We say that a committee C = (x, p) with leakage
probability p and voting rule x is informative if there exists an equilibrium
σ∗ such that σ∗i is informative for all i = 1, 2, 3. Finally, we define social
welfare in a standard way to be the aggregate probability with which the
committee decision is correct in as many dimensions as possible. Thus the
social welfare under a committee C = (x, p) with prior π is

















where, for z ∈ {a, b} in dimension k ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have Izk = 1 if wk = z and
0 otherwise. Welfare maximisation entails identifying an equilibrium that
corresponds to the highest level of social welfare.
3 Quality of Advice
We begin by characterising informative committees. The following theorem
shows that random transparency is a necessary feature of such committees
for any generic value of the prior π.
Theorem 1. Consider a committee C = (x, p) with voting rule x and leakage
probability p and let π be an arbitrary common prior. Then there exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium with the following properties: (i) If x = 2 then
for all p ∈ [0, 1] and for all π ∈ (1/2, 1), C = (x, p) is not informative; (ii)
If x = 3, then there exists π̃ ∈ (1/2, 1) such that (a) for each π < π̃, there
6Pivotality is redundant for the events where the voting profile m is observed by the
EV.
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exists p ∈ (0, 1) such that C(x, p) is informative, (b) for all π > π̃ and all
p ∈ [0, 1], C = (x, p) is not informative.7
Note that when si = b, both sources of information available to expert i
(viz. π and si) suggest that wi = b. Therefore, experts of all talent levels
vote mi = b since they induce a higher τ by making a correct prediction
rather than an incorrect one. With si = a, while one source (π) indicates
that wi = b the other source (si) indicates that wi = a. In this case there is
non-conformism exhibited by mediocre experts who have an innate tendency
to provide advice in favour of the unconventional choice A in the hope of
being hailed by the EV to have more talent if they can correctly predict an
outcome that was initially considered to be less possible (since π > 1/2). This
is the only force at work when the committee is fully transparent (p = 1).
Hence reducing the probability of transparency helps dampen non-conformist
behaviour. When secrecy of the committees can be guaranteed (p = 0), one
needs to look separately at the unanimous and the majority voting rules.
Under the unanimity rule (x = 3) if i votes as-if pivotal and mi = a, the
committee decision will be A, and the EV will know that mi = a. In this case,
the non-conformist force will be at play again as it then becomes essentially
a transparent committee. However, if mi = b, then while the decision will
be B, the EV will not be sure about i’s vote. Interestingly therefore, experts
can control opacity through their votes and hence mediocre experts tend
to be conformists and vote for B to keep the committee secret. With these
opposing forces at work, the proof of the theorem relies on purely quantitative
aspects and we show that there are degrees of transparency under which the
opposing forces of conforism and non-conformism counter-balance each other
and guarantee informative voting. Now consider x = 2 under full secrecy
(p = 0). Here, irrespective of whether the expert votes for a or b, he can never
reveal his personal vote to the EV. Hence the conformist tendency present
in a secretive unanimous committee is absent in a majoritarian committee,
although the non-conformist tendency remains. So informative votes cannot
be obtained with the majoritarian voting rule.
Our second result is on aggregate welfare where among other findings we
show that informative committees are never welfare maximising.
Theorem 2. Consider a committee C = (x, p) with voting rule x and leakage
probability p. Then, the following is true in equilibrium: (i) C = (x, p) is
informative if and only if it is not welfare maximising; (ii) When x = 3,
7We also prove that for the special case where π = π̃, the committee C = (3, 0) yields
informative voting.
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there exists two threshold levels of the common prior, 1/2 < π∗ ≤ π∗∗ < 1
such that (a) for all π < π∗, aggregate welfare is maximised if and only if
p = 1, and (b) for all π > π∗∗, aggregate welfare is maximised if and only if
p = 0; and (iii) There exists a threshold level of the common prior π̂ > 1/2
such that for all π < π̂, a fully transparent (p = 1) majoritarian (x = 2)
committee is socially better than a unanimous (x = 3) committee with any
transparency probability p ∈ [0, 1].
To understand Part (i) and part (ii a), suppose x = 3 and the prior π
is close to 1/2. Note that although the ex-post talent levels of the experts
are heterogeneous with probability 1, the weights assigned to their votes are
equal. Suppose two of the experts are highly talented while the third is
mediocre. If the two highly talented experts vote for A and the mediocre
expert votes for B, (all three voting in accordance to their true posterior
probabilities), the decision of the committee is B. This can potentially hurt
welfare, because even though the mediocre expert has voted informatively,
the quality of his information itself is weak owing to his mediocre talent,
and under x = 3 it proves decisive. Hence for a low prior, we require the
relatively mediocre experts to exhibit non-conformist tendencies through in-
sincere assertions and not vote informatively. This is achieved by having a
fully transparent committee (p = 1) since an increase in p pushes the cutoff
talent t∗ towards 1/2. On the other hand, when π is high (as in part (ii
b)), welfare maximisation warrants allowing only the very smart experts to
cast votes against the prior when they receive a contrarian signal a, thereby
minimising the chance of overturning the committee decision in favour of the
unconventional state. This under unanimity is achieved in a fully secret com-
mittee (p = 0). That the dichotomy between informative voting and welfare
maximisation holds for all levels of the prior is not obvious, making part (i)
of Theorem 2 particularly noteworthy. We collect this observation below:
Corollary 1. Informative Voting and Aggregate Welfare Maximisation through
committee decisions are mutually exclusive objectives if experts care only
about their individual reputations and have private information in indepen-
dent spheres of expertise.
Part (iii) of Theorem 2 shows that when the prior is low, a fully transpar-
ent committee using the simple majority rule is better in terms of aggregate
welfare than any unanimity committee. This is due to the fact that the sim-
ple majority rule does not suffer from any bias in favour of either choices,
whereas the unanimity rule is inherently biased in favour of the conventional
choice B. Hence even a fully transparent (p = 1) majoritarian committee
corresponds to a higher level of welfare than a secretive committee operating
under any leakage threat p.
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Remark 1 (Choice of transparency). As mentioned earlier, the probability p
with which vote profiles are ‘leaked’ to the EV is an exogenous element of the
environment. Although there is strong evidence in recent times of committee
designers trying to affect leakage probabilities through enhanced surveillance
and strict punishment threats, we made the exogeneity assumption to high-
light the fact that one may still have insufficient control over leakage. This
can then be viewed as an important constraint on committee design that has
been overlooked so far in the literature. And when faced with a known leakage
threat p one may ask if full transparency (which can always be achieved by
the designer through immediate publication of voting records) can be desir-
able in order to maximise welfare.8 While a complete analysis of this novel
mechanism design problem is computationally hard and beyond the scope of
this short note, our analysis does provide partial answers for the case when
the EV’s prior information is largely uninformative so that the role of expert
advice is most valuable. We show (in part (ii) of Theorem 2) that in this case
irrespective of the leakage threat p, the designer will strictly prefer to make
unanimous committees fully transparent rather than keeping them secretive.
What if messages are direct reports of the private signals and the com-
mittee decision rule is applied on these reports? Since talents are private in-
formation, aggregate information content from truthful reporting (of private
signals) in such a committee design cannot be more than what is achieved
under informative voting in the model proposed by Levy (2007a) that we
have used. This is because in our model each expert personally uses all his
available sources of information (viz. private signal, talent level (which is
never known by the EV) and the prior) to calculate the posterior probability
and votes accordingly. Another possibility is direct reporting of posteriors.
This would require an axiomatic approach since there is no obvious way to
aggregate probability judgements and it is not clear how to define majority.
An interesting question is whether there are reasonable axiomatic proper-
ties of probability aggregation rules where informative voting obtainable in
equilibrium is also welfare maximising.
Remark 2 (B - Unanimity). Although we have not explicitly analysed the
voting rule x = 1 where the non-conventional choice A is made whenever
at least one expert votes for it, it is easy to see that both in a transparent
and a secretive committee there is a reputation driven bias towards voting
for A. Hence an informative equilibrium will not be obtainable. It is also
straightforward to see that when the prior π is close to 1, the A - unanimity
voting rule (x = 3) will welfare dominate.
8We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this mechanism design aspect of the
problem.
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4 Questions and Extensions
By considering three experts in this binary set-up with B as the ‘status quo’
choice, we are able to compare between a procedurally biased (unanimity
that is biased towards B) and an unbiased (simple-majority) voting rule.
We have shown that the existence of procedural bias is crucial in obtaining
informative voting. With more than three experts, other aggregation rules
with varying intensities of procedural biases may be investigated. Since any
super-majority rule will be procedurally biased, albeit in varying degrees,
one may ask if the simple majority rule is the only one where even leak-
age threats cannot obtain informative voting. However, this will prove to
be computationally challenging. Nevertheless, the framework on committees
under leakage threat that we propose in this paper should help us to address
a number of important aspects of the environment that are currently miss-
ing in the literature. For example, an endogenous model of leakage where
individual committee members have the option to reveal their personal rec-
ommendations (or even the complete vote profile of the committee) to the
EV may be considered. A detailed analysis on whether randomness of trans-
parency is welfare enhancing for all possible aggregation rules also remains
an open question as is the issue of choice between transparency and opacity
under leakage threat that we have highlighted in Remark 1. Another interest-
ing extension would be to drop the assumption that all information sources
are equally salient. This may lead to a richer domain of mechanisms where
votes are weighted and these weights can be an additional design instrument.
Finally, one may allow for private information transmission among experts
through deliberation and investigate how leakage affects the value of infor-
mation flow across experts. We reserve these extensions for future research.
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Proof of Theorem 1 : We introduce the following definition. A voting strategy
σ is called a cut-off strategy if there exists a cut-off talent t(x, p; π) ∈ T such
that σi prescribes the following: mi = b for all ti ∈ T if si = b, and for all
ti ≤ t(x, p; π) if si = a and mi = a otherwise.
Let µwi = Pr[mi = a|wi, ti, ζ∗] where ζ∗ = σ∗. Let t∗(x, p; π) be the cut-off
talent in equilibrium. Then µa = 1 − t∗(x, p; π)2 and µb = (1 − t∗(x, p; π))2.
Let v(π, ti|si) := Pr(wi = a|π, si, ti). Let
πwi(x, t
∗(x, p; π)) = Pr[dx = A|mi = wi, {wj}j 6=i, t∗(x, p; π)],
and let αdx(wi, {wj}j 6=i, x) be the EV’s posterior belief that mi = a, given
that the EV knows the committee decision dx and has observed the states in
each dimension. Then,




∗(x, p; π)) + (1− µwi)πb(x, t∗(x, p; π))
, and
αB(wi, {wj}j 6=i, x) =
µwi(1− πa(x, t∗(x, p; π)))
µwi(1− πa(x, t∗(x, p; π))) + (1− µwi)(1− πb(x, t∗(x, p; π)))
.
Finally let α(dx, wi, x) be the probability estimate held by expert i of the




Pr[(wj, wk)|pivi, x, t∗(x, p; π)]αdx(wi, {wj}j 6=i, x),
where pivi stands for the event that expert i is pivotal. Let U(mi; p) be the
expected payoff of expert i with talent ti and private signal si from the vote
mi. Using the shorthand v := v(π, ti|si), we have
U(a; p) = p [vτ(a, a, ζ∗) + (1− v) τ(a, b, ζ∗)] + (1− p) [v (α(A, a, x)τ(a, a, ζ∗)
+(1− α(A, a, x))τ(b, a, ζ∗)) + (1− v) (α(A, b, x)τ(a, b, ζ∗) + (1− α(A, b, x))τ(b, b, ζ∗))],
and
U(b; p) = p[vτ(b, a, ζ∗) + (1− v)τ(b, b, ζ∗)] + (1− p)[v (α(B, a, x)τ(a, a, ζ∗)
+(1− α(B, a, x))τ(b, a, ζ∗)) + (1− v) (α(B, b, x)τ(a, b, ζ∗) + (1− α(B, b, x))τ(b, b, ζ∗))].
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Lemma 1. If si = b, then for any value of ti, any transparency probability
p ∈ [0, 1] and any voting rule x ∈ {2, 3}, we have (i) v < 1/2 and (ii) mi = b
is expert i’s best response for all talent levels. Hence voting is informative.
Proof. If si = b, then expert i with any ti is strictly better off with mi = b in
any committee C = (x, p) as long as p ∈ {0, 1}. 9 Since the expected payoff
for an expert in the committee C = (x, p) for any p ∈ (0, 1) is a convex
combination of these payoffs, this proves part (ii). To prove part (i) observe
that v(π, ti|b) < 1/2 if and only if 1−ti < π. But since ti ≥ 1/2 and π > 1/2,
this condition must always hold. Parts (i) and (ii) together then imply that
in each sub-game with si = b, voting is informative irrespective of the actual
realisation of the random variable ti.
Given Lemma 1, it is enough to consider the case when si = a. Note
that in this case, v(π, ti|a) ≤ 1/2 iff ti ≤ π. Hence, if expert i is using
an informative voting strategy, then it must be true that if si = a, we have
t(x, p; π) = π. It further follows that in equilibrium, C = (x, p) is informative
if and only if t∗(x, p; π) = π. Hence for informative committees we have
µa = 1− π2 and µb = (1− π)2.
Consider the indifference equation U(a; p) = U(b; p). Let v∗ ≡ v(π, π|a)
and τ̂(mi, wi, ζ
∗) be the evaluation when t∗(x, p; π) = π. Note that in this
case, v∗ = 1/2. Also note that by substituting t∗(x, p; π) = π, we are able to
express τ̂(mi, wi, ζ
∗) solely in terms of π. Therefore, U(a, p) and U(b, p) are
expressible only in terms of π and p. Let p(π) solve this indifference equation
for the case when t∗(x, p; π) = π. The strategy of the rest of the proof is as
follows. We shall show that such a solution never exists when x = 2 and
exists under certain restrictions when x = 3. We proceed as follows.
Suppose p(π) exists. Then, p(π) := N
N−Mwhere
M : = v∗(τ̂(b, a, ζ∗)− τ̂(a, a, ζ∗)) + (1− v∗)(τ̂(b, b, ζ∗)− τ̂(a, b, ζ∗)) and
N : = v∗(α(A; a, x)− α(B; a, x))(τ̂(b, a, ζ∗)− τ̂(a, a, ζ∗))
+(1− v∗)(α(A; b, x)− α(B; b, x))(τ̂(b, b, ζ∗)− τ̂(a, b, ζ∗)).
For existence of p(π), it is necessary that p(π) ≥ 0. For p(π) ≥ 0, there are
two exclusive necessary and sufficient conditions: either (I) [N ≥ 0 and N > M ]
or (II) [N ≤ 0 and N < M ]. Suppose condition (I) holds. As it is also nec-
essary that p(π) ≤ 1, it then follows that N ≤ N −M so that M ≤ 0. If
condition (II) holds, then by similar arguments it must be that M ≥ 0.
Claim 1. For all committees C = (x, p) and for all priors π ∈ (1/2, 1), we
have M < 0.
9This is shown in Lemma 3 of Levy (2004), and Proposition 2 of Levy (2007a).
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Proof. Since v∗ = 1/2, it follows that M < 0 if and only if τ̂(b, a, ζ∗) +
τ̂(b, b, ζ∗) < τ̂(a, b, ζ∗) + τ̂(a, a, ζ∗). In Lemma 2 of Levy (2004), it is shown
that τ̂(b, b, ζ∗) < τ̂(a, a, ζ∗) and τ̂(b, a, ζ∗) < τ̂(a, b, ζ∗) Hence M < 0 always
holds.
Claim 1 rules out condition (II) and for the rest of the proof we shall
only consider condition (I). We now give a direct proof of Part (i) of the
theorem. Let x = 2. It is routine to verify that if π ∈ {1/2, 1}, then
N < 0. Next, setting N = 0 and solving for π yields a unique real root
π ≈ −0.2208 /∈ [1/2, 1]. Since N is continuous in π, we conclude that for all
π ∈ [1/2, 1] it must be that N < 0. Thus we have shown that with x = 2,
condition (I) can never be satisfied. This proves part (i). We now prove part
(ii) of the theorem. Suppose x = 3. It is again routine to check the following:
at π = 1/2 we have N > 0; at π = 1 we have N < 0; and N = 0 if and only
if π = π̃(≈ 0.54197). Given these, the rest of the proof follows by invoking
the fact that N is continuous in π. This completes the proof of the theorem.
QED.
Proof of Theorem 2 : The following lemma will be useful in the proof of
Theorem 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose t∗(x, p; π) ∈ [1/2, 1] solves the indifference equation
U(a; p) = U(b; p). Then t∗(x, p; π) > t∗(x, p′; π) if and only if p < p′.
Proof. By suitable manipulation, the indifference equation U(a, p) = U(b, p)
can be expressed as pL = (1 − p)R, where L = U(a; 1) − U(b; 1) and R =
U(b, 0) − U(a, 0). For x = {2, 3}, we have: dL
dt
> 0 and dR
dt
< 0.10 Now
consider the cut-off talent level t∗(x, p; π) that solves the indifference equation
U(a; p) = U(b; p). Fix the value of t∗(x, p; π) thus obtained and suppose p
rises to p′ so that now p′L > (1 − p′)R. Let t∗(x, p′; π) be the new cut-off
talent that solves the indifference equation p′L = (1 − p′)R. The equality
p′L = (1 − p′)R can be attained in one of the following three ways: either
(i) L decreases and R increases, or (ii) both L and R fall but the fall in
L is larger than that in R, or (iii) both L and R rise but the rise in L is
smaller than that in R. But since dL
dt
> 0 and dR
dt
< 0, cases (ii) and (iii)
cannot be true as in each of these two cases the required directions of t∗(·)
are opposite to each other. Hence it must be that case (i) holds. But for that
case it must be that t∗(·) falls. To complete the proof, we address the special
situation where the equation U(a, p) = U(b, p) is solved at t∗(x, p; π) = 1/2.
For that case we can mimic the above proof by considering p′′ < p for which
p′′L < (1− p′′)R and then similarly show that t∗(x, p′′; π) > t∗(x, p; π).
10This is shown in Proposition 1 of Levy (2004) and Proposition 2 of Levy (2007a).
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Lemma 2 shows that as the probability of the committee being trans-
parent rises, the cut-off talent t∗ falls.11 Let x = 3. Fix p and π and use
the shorthand t := t∗(x, p; π) for the cut-off talent in equilibrium. Let tf be
the free solution from the first order condition of unconstrained optimisa-
tion of W (C(x, p), π), given by dW
dt
= 0. Then, tf is given by the following











A = (100π2 − 36π + 9)1/2|π − 1|.
To prove Part (i) observe that since 0 < t < 1, it suffices to check if
there exists π such that t = π from any of the above solutions. Inserting
tfk = π, k = 1, 2, 3, it is routine to check that for the first two solutions, viz.
tf1 and t
f
2 , this implies π = 1. For the remaining solution t
f
3 , we have π = 1
or π = 0. But since π ∈ (1/2, 1), this proves that informative voting cannot
be a solution to the aggregate welfare maximisation problem.
To prove Part (ii.a) define the function S(t) = 4t3 − 9t2 + 6t − 1. Note
that dW
dt
|π=1/2 = −3S(t). We first show that S(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [1/2, 1]. For
that, by invoking the fact that S(t) is a continuous function, it is sufficient to
observe that S ′(t) = 0 has exactly two solutions, t = 1/2 and t = 1, S(1) = 0
and S(1/2) = 0.25 > 0. It then follows that dW
dt
|π=1/2 < 0 for all values of
t. By continuity of W (·) in π, it follows that there exists 1/2 < π∗ < 1 such
that for each π ≤ π∗, we have dW
dt
< 0 for all values of t. Thus for such values
of π, it must be that t = 1/2. Now recall the definition of t∗(3, p; π) that
solves the indifference equation U(a; p) = U(b; p). By Lemma 2, it follows
that for each π ≤ π∗, p = 1 uniquely maximises W (3, p, π).
We prove Part (ii.b) in a similar fashion. Define the function H(t) =
t5 − 5t4 + 10t3 − 10t2 + 5t − 1. Note that dW
dt
|π=1 = −18H(t). We first
show that H(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [1/2, 1). This is established by the following
facts that can be easily checked: H ′(t) = 0 has a unique real root t = 1,
H ′(1/2) = 5/16 > 0, H(1/2) = −1/32 < 0 and H(1) = 0. Hence by
continuity of H(·), it follows that H(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [1/2, 1). By continuity
of W (·) in π, it follows that there exists π∗∗ < 1 such that for each π ≥ π∗∗,
we have dW
dt
> 0 for all values of t ∈ [1/2, 1). By Lemma 2 it follows that for
each π ≥ π∗∗, the value of p which maximises W (3, p, π) is p = 0.
We now prove part (iii). Given what we have proved thus far, it would
suffice to show that there exists a threshold value 1/2 < π̂ < 1 such that
for all π < π̂, we have W (2, 1, π) > W (3, 1, π). We first prove the following
claim.
Claim 2. When p = 1 and π = 1/2, then t∗(x, p; π) = 1/2.
11The proof of the lemma uses a ‘convexification’ argument on two extreme committees,
namely, C(x, 0) with weight 1−p and C(x, 1) with weight p. However it is important to note
that the cut-off talent t∗(x, p;π) is not in general equal to pt∗(x, 1;π) + (1− p)t∗(x, 0;π).
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Proof. Recall the indifference equation pL = (1 − p)R used in the proof of
Lemma 2. At p = 1 this indifference equation is solved if and only if L = 0,
where L = U(a; 1) − U(b; 1). At t∗(x, p; π) = 1/2, we have τ(a, a, ζ∗) =
τ(b, b, ζ∗) and τ(b, a, ζ∗) = τ(a, b, ζ∗). Using these, one can obtain L = (1 −
2v) (τ(a, a, ζ∗)− τ(b, a, ζ∗)). From Lemma 2 in Levy (2004) it follows that
τ(a, a, ζ∗) > τ(b, a, ζ∗). Hence L = 0 if and only if that v = 1/2 which is
possible at π = 1/2 if and only if t∗(x, 1; 1/2) = 1/2.
Let x = 2. Using Claim 2 we have W (2, 1, 1/2) = 15
8
. From part (2)
we know that when π < π∗ (where π∗ is as defined there), aggregate welfare
under x = 3 is maximised if and only if p = 1. So consider π = 1/2, p = 1 and
x = 3. Using Claim 2 once more we have W (3, 1, 1/2) = 27
6
. It follows that
W (2, 1, 1/2) > W (3, 1, 1/2). Note further that dW (x,p,π)
dt
|x=3,π=t=1/2 = −34 <
0, dW (x,p,π)
dt
|x=2,π=t=1/2 = 0 and d
2W (x,p,π)
dt2
|x=2,π=t=1/2 = −6 < 0. Theorem 1 in
Levy (2004) shows that dt(·)
dπ
> 0 for all x ∈ {2, 3} when p = 1. Hence, as π
rises from π = 1/2, the cut-off talent t rises for both x = 2 and x = 3. By
continuity of W (·) in π and t, there exists π̂ > 1/2 such that W (2, 1, π) >
W (3, 1, π) for all π < π̂. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. QED.
References
Fingleton, J. and Raith M., (2005), ‘Career Concerns of Bargainers,’ Journal
of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 21(1), pp. 179-204.
Gersbach, H. and Hahn V., (2001), ‘Should the Individual Voting Records
of Central Bankers be Published?’ Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion
Paper Number 02/01.
Gersbach, H. and Hahn V., (2011), ‘Information acquisition and transparency
in committees,’ International Journal of Game Theory, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-
011-0295-5.
Holmstrom, B., (1999), ‘Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Per-
spective,’ Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 66(1), pp. 169-182.
Levy, G., (2004), ‘Anti-herding and Strategic Consultation,’ European Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 48(3), pp. 503-525.
Levy, G., (2007a), ‘Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputa-
tion, and Voting Rules,’ American Economic Review, Vol. 97(1), pp.
150-168.
13
Levy, G., (2007b), ‘Decision Making Procedures for Committees of Careerist
Experts,’ American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol.
97(2), pp. 306-310.
Ottaviani, M. and Sorensen P., (2006a), ‘Professional Advice,’ Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 126(1), pp. 120-142.
Ottaviani, M. and Sorensen P., (2006b), ‘Reputational Cheap Talk,’ RAND
Journal of Economics, Vol. 37(1), pp. 155-175.
Scharfstein, D.S and Stein, J.C., (1990), ‘Herd behaviour and investment,’
American Economic Review, Vol. 80(3), pp. 465-479.
Seidmann, D. J., (2010), ‘A theory of voting patterns and performance in
private and public committees,’ Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 36(1),
pp. 49-74.
Sibert, A., (2003), ‘Monetary Policy Committees: Individual and Collective
Reputations,’ Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 70(3), pp. 649-665.
Stasavage, D., (2007), ‘Polarization and Publicity: Rethinking the Benefits of
Deliberative Democracy’, Journal of Politics, Vol. 69(1), pp. 59-72.
Swank O.H., and Visser, B., (2010), ‘Is transparency to no avail?,’ Tinberegen
Institute Discussion Paper.
Zwiebel, J., (1995), “Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation,”
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 103(1), pp. 1-25.
14
